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preparation and conduct of its case” (id.).No judicial decisions or state practice and opinio juris
are cited, and no factual basis for the expectation is reviewed. Presumably, more analysis will
come at the merits stage of the case.
Although the attorney-client privilege is well established in many legal systems, the closest
analogy might have occurred last year when defense attorneys for a Guanta´namo prisoner
charged thatU.S. intelligence agencies were eavesdropping on conversationswith their clients.
In that context, the military judge in the case suggested removing the microphone from the
defense table to ease the concern.21Nevertheless, it is doubtful that onewill findmany reported
instances of government intelligence agencies’ seeking to monitor attorney-client communi-
cations, with the risk that the communications would be shared with that government’s attor-
neys to the potential prejudice of the client.22 Nor does it seem likely that one will find prec-
edent—in either reported decisions or state practice—involving the seizure or interception by
one state of the communications of an attorney representing another state, when those two
states are involved in dispute settlement or negotiations.
The conclusion that such a seizure or intrusion violates customary international law will
involve new legal reasoning. It is hard to see how this plausible rule derives from Article 2(1)
of the Charter—the principle that the “Organization [i.e., the United Nations] is based on
the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” How does the seizure in this case
affect the United Nations as an organization?
Perhaps the principle in Charter Article 2(3) is more relevant—that members “shall settle
their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security, and justice, are not endangered.” Access by one state to the privileged communica-
tions of another state with its legal advisers when those states are engaged in an arbitration or
negotiation of a dispute between them may endanger peaceful settlement of the dispute in a
manner consistent with justice.
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On August 21, 2009, the Panamanian-flagged tanker Virginia G was arrested by Guinea-
Bissau in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for unlawfully bunkering (refueling) foreign ves-
sels fishing there. Several days later, the Virginia G and the gas oil (diesel) on board were con-
fiscated by the government. Subsequent provisional measures orders of the Regional Court of
21 Jane Sutton, Rip out Guantanamo Microphones to Prevent Eavesdropping: Judge, REUTERS, Feb. 4, 2013, at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/05/us-usa-guantanamo-idUSBRE91400T20130205.
22 Such a situationwas reported inFebruary2014.Australia intercepted communications between Indonesia and
its American lawyers on trade issues and shared that information with theU.S. government while theUnited States
was involved in trade negotiations with Indonesia and in disputes with Indonesia, apparently on the same issues,
before theWorldTradeOrganization. JamesRisen&Laura Poitras, Spying by N.S.A. Ally Entangled U.S. Law Firm,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2014, at A1, available in 2014 WLNR 4661358.
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Bissau suspended the confiscation at the request of the owner.Nevertheless, theGuinea-Bissau
authorities had the gas oil removed fromthe ship.The government’s decision to release the ship
more than a year after its arrest followed “the persistent request by the Embassy of Spain for
its release” and took into consideration, among other things, Guinea-Bissau’s “friendship and
cooperationwith theKingdomof Spain in the field of fisheries, knowing that although the ves-
sel has a Panamanian flag, it belongs to a Spanish company” (paras. 82, 140).
In its judgment ofApril 14, 2014,1 the InternationalTribunal for the Lawof the Sea (ITLOS
or Tribunal) concluded that, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(Convention),2 the bunkering of vessels fishing in the EEZ is subject to regulation by the
coastal state, and that confiscation of a vessel and its cargo is a permissible penalty for violation
of the coastal state’s fisheries regulations in the EEZ, but that confiscation was not “necessary
to ensure compliance” with those regulations in the circumstances of this case (para. 269).
Damages were awarded for the confiscation of the gas oil and for the cost of repairs to the ship,
but not for lost profits during the ship’s detention, the largest element of the damages claimed.
Panamaoriginally submitted the dispute to arbitrationunderAnnexVII to theConvention.
In its letter of June 3, 2011, notifyingGuinea-Bissau of the submission, Panama also raised the
possibility of “resolving the dispute contentiously, yet in a less costly manner” pursuant to an
agreement to submit it “to ITLOS through an exchange of letters” (para. 2). Guinea-Bissau
agreed to the transfer to ITLOS, “whose jurisdiction in this case Guinea-Bissau accepts fully,”
and Panama notified the Tribunal of the special agreement on July 4, 2011 (paras. 3, 5).3 The
Tribunal upheld the contention of Guinea-Bissau that it retained the right to make counter-
claims and to interpose objections to the admissibility of Panama’s claims (paras. 24, 101).
There were no objections to jurisdiction under Article 297 of the Convention or otherwise.4
The objection to admissibility on grounds of the absence of a genuine link between Panama
and the ship was rejected unanimously (para. 452(3)). The Tribunal reaffirmed its prior con-
clusion that the purpose of the genuine link requirement “is to secure more effective imple-
mentation of the duties of the flag State, and not to establish criteria by reference to which the
validity of the registration of ships in a flag State may be challenged by other States” (para.
112).5 The Tribunal also declared that the “meaning of ‘genuine link’” is the requirement for
the flag state under Article 94 of the Convention to “exercise effective jurisdiction and control
over th[e] ship in order to ensure that it operates in accordance with generally accepted inter-
national regulations, procedures and practices” (para. 113).6
1 M/VVirginia G (Pan./Guinea-Bissau), CaseNo. 19 (ITLOSApr. 14, 2014), 53 ILM1164 (2014) [hereinafter
Judgment]. Judgments of the Tribunal cited herein are available at its website, http://www.itlos.org.
2 UnitedNationsConvention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 73(1), opened for signatureDec. 10, 1982, 1833UNTS
397, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/ [hereinafter Convention].
3 Former ITLOS Judge Tullio Treves and Professor Jose´Manuel Se´rvulo Correia were appointed by Panama and
Guinea-Bissau, respectively, as judges ad hoc.
4 Article 297 limits compulsory jurisdiction over disputes concerning the exercise of coastal state sovereign rights,
including fishing in the EEZ.
5 Quoting M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 1999 ITLOS Rep. 10, 42, para. 83 (reported by Bernard
H. Oxman & Vincent Bantz at 94 AJIL 140 (2000)) [hereinafter Saiga (No. 2)].
6 This analysis casts doubt on alternative hypotheses advanced at the International LawCommission in the 1950s
andmore recently at the InternationalMaritimeOrganization, theFood andAgricultureOrganization, and theUN
General Assembly. SeeVincent P. Cogliati-Bantz,Disentangling the “Genuine Link”: Enquiries in Sea, Air and Space
Law, 79 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 383, 398–415 (2010).
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Having examined the information before it and finding no reason to question Panama’s
exercise of effective jurisdiction and control over the ship, the Tribunal decided that a genuine
link existed at the timeof the incident (paras. 114, 117, 325).TheTribunal tooknote ofArticle
91(1) of the Convention, which does not impose “any limitations on the nationality of ship-
owners or crew” as regards the right of a state to grant its nationality to ships (para. 323), and
unanimously concluded that Guinea-Bissau had violated Article 73(4) of the Convention “by
failing to notify Panama, as the flag State, of the detention and arrest of the M/V Virginia G
and subsequent actions taken against the vessel and its cargo” (paras. 328, 452(11)).
The judgment also rejected the objection to the admissibility of Panama’s claims on the
grounds that “the owner of the vessel and the crew are not nationals of Panama” (paras. 129,
452(4)). Relying on its prior decision to similar effect,7 the Tribunal found that “theM/V Vir-
ginia G, its crew and cargo on board as well as its owner and every person involved or interested
in its operations are to be treated as an entity linked to the flag State” (para. 127). It therefore
held that “Panama is entitled to bring claims in respect of alleged violations of its rights under
the Convention which resulted in damages to these persons or entities” whether or not they
are its nationals (id.).
In addition, the Tribunal rejected the objection, on grounds of nonexhaustion of local rem-
edies, to the admissibility of claimsmade in the interests of individuals or private entities (para.
452(5)). Article 295 of the Convention conditions access to its compulsory dispute settlement
procedures on exhaustion of local remedies “where this is required by international law.” After
examining Article 14(1) of the International LawCommission’s Draft Articles onDiplomatic
Protection,8 the Tribunal considered whether the exhaustion of local remedies is required
because the preponderant element of the claim related to injury to private persons rather than
a direct injury to the state.9 It concluded that the principal rights under theConvention alleged
to have been violated “include the right of Panama to enjoy freedom of navigation and other
internationally lawful uses of the seas” in the EEZ under Article 58 of the Convention “and
its right that the laws and regulations of the coastal State [be] enforced in conformity with arti-
cle 73of theConvention” (para. 157).Those rights “belong toPanamaunder theConvention”
and violations of them “thus amount to direct injury to Panama” (id.).10
Panama argued that the provision of bunkering services is encompassed by the freedoms and
rights of all states in the EEZ under Article 58(1) of the Convention, notably the freedom of
navigation and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to that freedom (para. 165).
In this regard, it distinguished between the coastal state’s regulation of bunkering by fishing
vessels because of their fishing activities in the EEZ, and the regulation of the bunkering vessel
7 Saiga (No. 2), at 48, para. 106.
8 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, Art. 14(1), in Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-
Eighth Session, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 16, 20, UN Doc. A/61/10 (2006).
9 Panama initially argued that it was bringing the case “within the framework of diplomatic protection,” Judg-
ment, para. 119, but thereafter maintained that it was claiming “a violation of its own right to secure, in respect of
vessels flying its flag, freedoms for which the Convention provides,” id., para. 142. Panama added that it would
allocate respective portions of the compensation it might be awarded to the private parties who suffered damage or
loss. Id., para. 143.
10 Two judges, who believed that the claim was preponderantly brought on the basis of an injury to private per-
sons, nevertheless concluded that exhaustion of local remedies was not required because the “repeated intrusion of
the political and administrative authorities of the country into the course of justice precluded the possibility of any
effective redress or reparation.” Judgment, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Cot and Kelly, para. 32.
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that is at issue in this case (para. 177). Guinea-Bissau argued that bunkering in support of fish-
ing operations in the EEZ has a much stronger connection to the right of the coastal state to
regulate fishing there under Article 56 and related provisions than to freedom of naviga-
tion (para. 193).11
The Tribunal interpreted the Article 62(4) list of fisheries management measures that may
be taken by the coastal state to require “a direct connection to fishing” (para. 215). It observed
that such a connection exists with respect to bunkering of foreign vessels fishing in the EEZ
“since this enables them to continue their activities without interruption at sea” (id.). In this
context, the Tribunal cited and was “guided by” broad definitions in various international
agreements of “fishing” and “fishing-related activities” that include support operations and
support vessels (para. 216). It also noted that other states, in West Africa and elsewhere, reg-
ulate bunkering of foreign vessels fishing in the EEZ, and “that there is no manifest objection
to such legislation and . . . it is, in general, complied with” (para. 218).
In the view of the Tribunal, Article 56 of the Convention concerning the coastal state’s sov-
ereign rights regarding natural resources in the EEZ is to be read together with Article 58 on
the rights and freedoms of all states in the EEZ. It concluded that “the bunkering of foreign
vessels engaged in fishing” in the EEZ “is an activity which may be regulated by the coastal
State concerned,” but that the coastal state “does not have such competence with regard to
other bunkering activities, unless otherwise determined in accordance with the Conven-
tion” (para. 223).
Panama argued that the payment required for the authorization of bunkering in reality rep-
resents an attempt to extend tax or customs legislation to the EEZ (paras. 178–79, 231). In
theSaiga case, theTribunal found that, under theConvention, the coastal state has jurisdiction
to apply its customs laws and regulations within the twenty-four-mile limit of the contiguous
zone andwith respect to artificial islands, installations, and structures in the EEZ, but not with
respect to any other parts of theEEZ.12Although this finding “applies to laws on taxes as it does
to laws concerning customs,” the Tribunal agreed with Guinea-Bissau that the requisite pay-
ment is a fee that “is not guided by its fiscal interests but is for services rendered in connection
with the authorization of bunkering” and “does not constitute an attempt to extend its tax and
customs legislation” to the EEZ (paras. 233–34).13 Moreover, the procedure for obtaining a
permit was not unduly burdensome (para. 235).
Article 73(1) of the Convention authorizes the coastal state, in the exercise of its sovereign
rights over the living resources in the EEZ, to “take suchmeasures, including boarding, inspec-
tion, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws
and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention.” Referring to its previous
11 The Tribunal did not address the environmental protection argument made by Guinea-Bissau, noting that
“Guinea-Bissau incorporated its regulations on bunkering in its legislation on fishing rather than in legislation con-
cerning the protection of the marine environment.” Judgment, para. 224.
12 Saiga (No. 2), supra note 5, at 54, para. 127.
13 Article 62(4) of the Convention permits the coastal state to require, from foreign vessels permitted to fish in
the EEZ, “fees and other forms of remuneration” and other benefits related to fishing that are of economic value
to itself and its nationals. The opinion does not purport to limit that right, or the collection of royalties, taxes, and
other revenues in connection with the issuance, enjoyment, and exercise of rights to explore and exploit hydrocar-
bons and other resources of the continental shelf.
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observation to this effect,14 the Tribunal noted that many coastal states provide for the con-
fiscation of vessels for fisheries violations in the EEZ. It interpreted Article 73(1) in the light
of that practice and held that legislation authorizing confiscation “is not per se in violation of ”
that provision (para. 257).
The Tribunal emphasized that enforcement measures must be necessary to ensure compli-
ancewith the laws and regulations of the coastal state (para. 256). “Whether or not confiscation
is justified in a given case depends on the facts and circumstances” (para. 257). In this regard,
theVirginia G did not have the requisite written authorization for bunkering and had not paid
the fee prescribed, “amounting to a value of €112.00” (para. 266). This is “a serious violation,”
but there were “mitigating factors” (paras. 267, 268). The two fishing vessels arrested together
with theVirginia G for unlawful bunkering weremerely fined and quickly released; two others
were neither arrested nor fined (para. 268). The proper authorities had been informed of the
bunkering. The failure to obtain written authorization was “rather the consequence of a mis-
interpretation of the correspondence” with government officials “than an intentional viola-
tion” (para. 269). In these circumstances, the confiscation “was not necessary either to sanction
the violation committed or to deter the vessels or their operators from repeating this violation”
(id.). The Tribunal thus found that the confiscation of the vessel and the gas oil on board vio-
lated Article 73(1) of the Convention (para. 452(8)).
Article 73(2) of the Convention requires prompt release of an arrested vessel and crew upon
the posting of reasonable bond. The Tribunal rejected Panama’s contention that Guinea-Bis-
sau’s statutory procedure for obtaining such a release was unreasonable and unaffordable
(paras. 295, 452(9)). This conclusion, in turn, underlay the Tribunal’s rejection of Panama’s
claim for lost profits on behalf of the owner; namely, that there was no direct causal nexus
between confiscation of the vessel and loss of profit because the owner failed to use the available
procedures for prompt release on bond (paras. 436, 438).15
Applying Article 73(2) in a prior case, the Tribunal had required the release on bond of the
master of a fishing vessel whose passport had been taken away.16 In this case, the question
whether Guinea-Bissau had violated the Convention by holding the passports of crew mem-
bers for four months was raised in the context of the prohibition in Article 73(3) on impris-
onment or other forms of corporal punishment as penalties for fisheries violations in the EEZ.
The Tribunal found no contravention of that prohibition (paras. 310, 452(10)).
* * * *
The judgment in this casehelps clarify the interpretation andapplicationof theConvention,
especially with regard to the regulation of foreign vessels fishing in the EEZ. In reaching its
decision on the two most important fisheries management issues presented, the authority to
regulate bunkering and to impose confiscation as a penalty under the Convention, the Tribu-
nal carefully considered the way those issues were addressed inmunicipal legislation and inter-
national agreements on fishing. This attention to the practice of the parties to the Convention
14 Citing Tomimaru ( Japan v. Russ.), Prompt Release, 2005–07 ITLOS Rep. 74, 96, para. 72 (reported by Ber-
nard H. Oxman at 102 AJIL 316 (2008)).
15 Claims for lost profits of the charterer after the termination date of the charter party were rejected on con-
tractual grounds. Judgment, para. 437. Contra Separate Opinion of Judge Akl, paras. 9–10.
16 Camouco (Pan. v. Fr.), Prompt Release, 2000 ITLOS Rep. 10, 32–33, para. 71 (reported by Bernard H.
Oxman & Vincent P. Bantz at 94 AJIL 713 (2000)).
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in its application increases the likelihood that the Tribunal’s interpretation will be welcomed
by governments and will promote stability.17
The judgment suggests that bunkering in the EEZ as such is not subject to coastal state juris-
diction; there must be a specific basis in the Convention for the coastal state’s competence.
That is, Panama correctly argued that in principle bunkering is governed by the freedom of
navigation and related activities under Article 58(1), and Guinea-Bissau correctly argued that
bunkering of vessels fishing in the EEZ is subject to coastal state jurisdiction over the conser-
vation andmanagement of living resources in the EEZunder Article 56 and related provisions.
The tension between the two propositions results from the preservation of freedom of navi-
gation but not freedom of fishing in the EEZ.
Two key questions that divided the Tribunal were the exhaustion of local remedies and the
lawfulness of the confiscation.Eachwas decidedby a vote of 14-9,with the same judges on each
side.18
As to the first question, states implement their freedom of navigation under international
law primarily by authorizing private ships of their nationality to exercise that freedom. The
security and economy of many states, including, but not limited to, flag states, depend on that
freedom. Perhaps itsmost important legal consequence is the right to ensure that it is respected
by other states. This was a principal reason for the inclusion of compulsory dispute settlement
provisions in the Convention. Freedom of navigation is particularly important in the EEZ
because it applies to the same area where the coastal state has sovereign rights with respect to
natural resources and attendant enforcement powers with respect to foreign ships.19 Making
vindication of the freedom of navigation and related rights in an international tribunal depen-
dent on exhaustion of local remedies in the arresting state would undermine that basic con-
struct. The Tribunal performed a signal service in recognizing this.
The duty of the coastal state under Article 62(2) of the Convention to “give other States
access to the surplus of the allowable catch” and the extensive provisions addressing the rights
and duties of the coastal state regarding fishing, including Article 73, form part of the overall
balance between the interests of the coastal state and those of the flag state in the EEZ. The
protection of the regulatory and enforcement interests of the coastal state in the EEZ from
interference by international tribunals is addressed by the Convention in great detail, notably
in Articles 292(3), 294, 297, and 298. In that context, one cannot easily sustain the suggestion
that the flag state faces an additional obstacle of exhaustion of local remedies when a foreign
ship is arrested in the EEZ; that position could also have the perverse effect of discouraging the
kind of liberal interpretation of the scope of the coastal state’s rights that characterizes the opin-
ion in this case on the basic issues of the coastal state’s competence with respect to fishing. A
very different situation would be presented where, for example, the object of a confiscation is
a property interest in continental shelf hydrocarbons or installations. That is not this case.
As to the second question, the Tribunal revealed substantial sensitivity to the difficulties
posed by the widespread temptation to resort to confiscation of fishing vessels. Mandating
harsh treatment of foreigners is perhaps too facile away to curry favorwith local constituencies.
17 The Tribunal did not, however, assert that the subsequent practice amounted to an agreement of the parties
regarding the interpretation of the Law of the Sea Convention. SeeVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art.
31(3)(b), opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.
18 The majority on these issues did not include judges from African or Lusophone countries.
19 See Convention, supra note 2, Art. 297(1)(a).
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Confiscation can be a useful enforcement tool, but it can also be a blunt instrument that is not
readily calibrated to make the punishment fit the crime. This case offered a good opportunity
to address the problem.20 The Tribunal emphasized that the necessity and reasonableness of
a penaltymust be assessed on a case-by-case basis in light of the circumstances. In that context,
it went out of its way to uphold the law of Guinea-Bissau by finding that its statute affords the
authorities and courts flexibility over whether or not to confiscate. Accordingly, it seems
unlikely that reasoned determination of penalties by law enforcement professionals and
municipal courts in light of the circumstances of the violation will be second-guessed.
The implications of this decision for international human rights law merit further analysis.
The Tribunal quoted a passage from a prior case that a decision to confiscate should not be
taken “through proceedings inconsistent with international standards of due process of law”
(para. 254).21While it did not explicitly rely on that statement in assessing the penalty of con-
fiscation in this case, it did state that the “principle of reasonableness applies generally to
enforcement measures under article 73” (para. 270).
TheVirginia G judgmentwas accompanied by five declarations, four separate opinions, and
four dissenting opinions. In all, sixteen of the twenty-three judges wrote or joined one of these,
and two judges wrote or joined two. The president and four other judges neither wrote nor
joined any.
Judges, scholars, and practitioners are familiar with the possible tension between the need
to forge andmaintain a coherent majority on a collegial court and the need to write a coherent
opinion. If remedies, including the quantification of damages, can offer a fertile field for
accommodation in aid of the first objective, articulation of the outcome may take its toll on
the second. The rationale for the decision to deny any recovery for lost profits in this case is a
good example.22 In reaching their decision, the judges were doubtless aware of alternatives,
such as reducing damages on grounds of contributory fault or failure to mitigate losses. It is
perhaps not coincidental that the proffered rationale for denying anydamages for the shipown-
er’s lost profits, namely, that the owner had failed to seek prompt release under the laws of
Guinea-Bissau, evokes at least some of the considerations that inform the exhaustion-of-local-
remedies requirement and mirrors the consequences of failure to do so.
BERNARDH.OXMAN
Of the Board of Editors
VINCENT P. COGLIATI-BANTZ
T. C. Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland
20 This is not the first time that the Tribunal has confronted complexity and lack of clarity in coastal state leg-
islation. The law of Guinea-Bissau created confusion in the Juno Trader case over the effect of a decision by an
administrative body to confiscate the vessel. See Juno Trader (St. Vincent v. Guinea-Bissau), Prompt Release, 2004
ITLOS Rep. 17; Vincent P. Bantz, Views from Hamburg: The Juno Trader Case or How to Make Sense of the Coastal
State’s Rights in the Light of Its Duty of Prompt Release, 24U.QUEENSL. L.J. 415, 422 (2005). In theTomimaru case,
supra note 14, considerable controversy surrounded the procedure in Russian law applicable to a bond in parallel
administrative and criminal proceedings.
21 Quoting Tomimaru, supra note 14, at 96, para. 76.
22 See Judgment, Separate Opinion of Judge Akl, passim; Separate Opinion of Judge Paik, paras. 39–48; Dec-
laration of Judge ad hoc Treves, paras. 2–4.
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